In Federalist No. 18, Hamilton and Madison team up to address the ongoing issue of the insufficiency of the present confederation to preserve the union.

One of the key takeaways from this essay is summed up in these words a weak government, when not at war, is ever agitated by internal dissentions, so those never fail to bring on fresh calamities from abroad. As proof of the pudding they offer, they recount a history of Greece and how the relatively weak union they formed eventually broke down as rival city states went to war. Had Greece … been united by a stricter confederation, and perservered in her union, she would have never have worn the chains of Macedon, and might have proved a barrier to the vast projects of Rome.

The majority of the essay is spent recounting the histories of the Grecian republics, and the battle between Athens and Sparta and the Achaean league in particular, because it teaches more than one lesson. It emphatically illustrates the tendency of federal bodies rather to anarchy among the members, than to tyranny in the head. As a result, there should be little concern about the Union trying to abuse the power it is given. The essay is a good read, and a great refresher on some of the finer points of historical inquiry, but if you’re in a hurry you can skip the history lesson and get right to the takeaway – a strong Union is always better than a weak confederacy.

In Federalist No. 17, Hamilton again continues his discussion of the insufficiency of the present confederation to preserve the union.

In this essay, he moves on from the discussion of the ability of a loose confederacy to both claim and protect the territories, posts, and natural resources that it should be entitled to and away from the discussion of the increased risk of Civil War presented by a loose confederacy to address the objection that the government of the Union [may be] too powerful and enable it to absorb those residuary authorities, which it might be judged proper to leave with the States for local purposes.

To this end, Hamilton admits that he is at a loss to discover what temptation the persons entrusted with the administration of the general government could ever feel to divest the States of the authorities of that description. He notes that commerce, finance, negotiation, and war seem to comprehend all the objects which have charms for minds governed by that passion; and all the powers necessary to those objects ought, in the first instance, to be lodged in the national depository. After all, we must deal with foreign nations as one nation, or we are no better than a collection of loose confederacies, regardless of what title we convey on the union.

Furthermore, the administration of private justice between the citizens of the same State, the supervision of agriculture and of other concerns of a similar nature, all those things, in short, which are proper to be provided for by local legislation, can never be desirable cares of a general jurisdiction. As such, the Union would see no benefit in pursuing them at the federal level, so there should be no cause for concern because it is therefore improbable that there should exist a disposition in the federal councils to usurp the powers with which they are connected; because the attempt to exercise those powers would be as troublesome as it would be nugatory.

But even, for argument’s sake, if we assume that mere wantonness and lust of domination would be sufficient to beget that disposition, it is the case that it will always be far more easy for the State governments to encroach upon the national authorities than for the national government to encroach upon the State authorities.

Furthermore, there is one transcendent advantage belonging to the province of the State governments, which alone suffices to place the
matter in a clear and satisfactory light, — I mean the ordinary administration of criminal and civil justice. This, of all others, is
the most powerful, most universal, and most attractive source of popular obedience and attachment. As a result, this great cement of society, which will diffuse itself almost wholly through the channels of the particular governments, independent of all other causes of influence, would insure them so decided an empire over their respective citizens as to render them at all times a complete counterpoise, and, not unfrequently, dangerous rivals to the power of the Union.

In Federalist No. 16, Hamilton continues his discussion of the insufficiency of the present confederation to preserve the union.

In this essay, Hamilton begins by noting that it has been seen that
delinquencies in the members of the Union are its natural and necessary offspring; and that whenever they happen, the only constitutional remedy is force, and the immediate effect of the use of it, civil war. Truer words could not have been said as History served to prove Hamilton right (with the civil wars that would still erupt until the Union was complete and in agreement on core principles).

Furthermore, if there should not be a large army constantly at the disposal of the national government it would either not be able to
employ force at all, or, when this could be done, it would amount to a war between parts of the Confederacy concerning the infractions of a league, in which the strongest combination would be most likely to prevail, whether it consisted of those who supported or of those who resisted the general authority. In other words, while civil war could occur within a Union, the potential for civil war is much higher between a loose conglomeration of confederacies.

In addition, where military is concerned, even in those confederacies which have been composed of members smaller than many of our counties, the principle of legislation for sovereign States, supported by military coercion, has never been found effectual. Plus, it has rarely been attempted to be employed, but against the weaker members; and in most instances attempts to coerce the refractory and disobedient
have been the signals of bloody wars, in which one half of the confederacy has displayed its banners against the other half.

So, if we want to minimize the chances of civil war, a Union is much better than a loose collection of confederacies, especially when the Union stands as one.

In Federalist No. 15, Hamilton returns to the helm to address the insufficiency of the present confederation to preserve the union; a topic he will take up in the next few essays. He does so very astutely in the questions that he asks. Consider the following:

Have we valuable territories and important posts in the possession of a foreign power which, by express stipulations, ought long since to have been surrendered?
These are still retained, to the prejudice of our interests, not less than
of our rights.

Are we in a condition to resent or to repel the aggression?
We have neither troops, nor treasury, nor
government.

Are we even in a condition to remonstrate with dignity?
The just imputations on our own faith, in respect to
the same treaty, ought first to be removed.

Are we entitled by nature and compact to a free participation in the navigation of the Mississippi?
Spain excludes us from it.

Is public credit an indispensable resource in time of public danger?
We seem to
have abandoned its cause as desperate and irretrievable.

Is commerce of importance to national wealth?
Ours is at the lowest
point of declension.

Is respectability in the eyes of foreign powers a safeguard against foreign encroachments?
The imbecility
of our government even forbids them to treat with us. Our ambassadors abroad are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty.

Is a violent and unnatural decrease in the value of land a symptom of national distress?
The price of improved land in most
parts of the country is much lower than can be accounted for by the quantity of waste land at market, and can only be fully
explained by that want of private and public confidence, which are so alarmingly prevalent among all ranks, and which have
a direct tendency to depreciate property of every kind.

Is private credit the friend and patron of industry?
That most useful
kind which relates to borrowing and lending is reduced within the narrowest limits, and this still more from an opinion of
insecurity than from the scarcity of money.

In other words, the current confederacy of the time could not:

• secure the valuable territories and foreign posts that would be the right of the Union
• repel an aggression by a foreign empire
• remonstrate with dignity
• freely navigate the Mississippi
• secure the public credit required for a strong nation
• engage in free and unrestricted commerce
• gain sufficient respectability in the eyes of foreign powers to prevent unwanted encroachments
• etc.

In other words, given the lack of power, resources, and population within each of the separate loose confederacies, neither on its own could hope to preserve the union against an attack thereon.
That’s why Hamilton implores us to make a firm stand for our safety, our tranquillity, our dignity, our reputation and at last break the fatal charm which has too long seduced us from the paths of felicity and prosperity.

In Federalist No. 14, Madison returns to the helm to answer objections to the proposed constitution from extent of territory.

The first thing Madison notes is that, in a democracy, the people meet and exercise the government in person; in a republic, they assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents. A democracy, consequently, will be confined to a small spot. A republic may be extended over a large region. Hence, any objections to the loss of democracy should be refuted by this statement alone as a republic can extend government by the people over a much larger territory.

Then he goes on to note that, in the first place it is to be remembered that the general government is not to be charged with the whole power of making and administering laws. Its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects, which concern all the members of the republic,
but which are not to be attained by the separate provisions of any. The subordinate governments, which can extend their care to all those other subjects which can be separately provided for, will retain their due authority and activity. Hence, any objections to the government amassing too much power should be dealt with as the government gets no more power than the people give it.

In addition, he notes that if some distant states should derive less benefit, therefore, from the Union in some respects than the less distant States, they will derive greater benefit from it in other respects, and thus the proper equilibrium will be maintained throughout. So while some states may have to send representatives further than others to take their seat on the government, they will benefit from the greater protection offered by the union.

So while objections can be made as to the potential strength of a union, versus a loose confederacy, they can also be countered. In this piece, Madison echoes Hamilton and again conveys the argument that united we stand and divided we fall.