In Federalist No. 8, while addressing the people of the State of New York, Hamilton continues his discussion of the insufficiency of the present Confederation to preserve the Union by addressing the consequences of hostilities between the states.

Hamilton starts off by noting that war between the States, in the first period of their separate existence, would be accompanied with much greater distresses than it commonly is in those countries where regular military establishments have long obtained. This is because the states would lack the disciplined armies that render sudden conquests impracticable and prevent the rapid desolation which used to mark the progress of war prior to their introduction. The fortification they provide tends to mutually obstruct invasion. As a result, in these circumstances, the history of war is no longer a history of nations subdued and empires overturned, but of towns taken and retaken; of battles that decide nothing; of retreats more beneficial than victories; of much effort and little acquisition. But, in America, the scene would be altogether reversed and the populous States would, with little difficulty, overrun their less populous neighbours and war, therefore, would be desultory and predatory.

And while standing armies are not provided against in the Constitution being proposed, they must inevitably result from a dissolution of the Confederacy. Frequent war and constant
apprehension, which require a state of constant preparation, will infallibly produce them and the States or confederacies that made use of them [would gain] a superiority over their neighbours.

And we also have to consider that there is a wide difference, also, between military establishments in a country seldom exposed by its situation to internal
invasions, and in one which is often subject to them, and always apprehensive of them. In the latter, the perpetual menacings of danger oblige the government to be always prepared to repel it; its armies must be numerous enough for instant defense. And when armies become numerous, a continual state of war becomes inevitable.

But, if we are wise enough to preserve the Union we may for ages enjoy an advantage similar to that of an insulated situation instead of being prey to the means of defending ourselves against
the ambition and jealousy of each other.

In short, if a Union is not formed, the confederacy will soon fall apart as the smaller States get wiped out by the larger states in war. In other words, division only leads to tension, strife, and inevitably war but union leads to understanding and peace.

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Our last post began our discussion of the dangers from dissensions between the states that is covered by Hamilton in Federalist No. 6 and Federalist No. 7. In that post, we discussed how Hamilton noted that we had no reason to confide in those reveries which would seduce us into an expectation of peace and cordiality between the members of the present confederacy, in a state of separation given that men are subject to aversions, predilections, rivalships, and desires of unjust acquisitions and popular assemblies [are] frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent propensities. This has been proven again and again throughout history as Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage were all republics and were as often engaged in wars, both offensive and defensive, as the neighbouring monarchies.

However, if the stats form a union that is a Confederate Republic and their constitution prevents the differences that neighbourhood occasions, it will extinguish that secret jealousy which disposes all states to aggrandize themselves at the expense of their neighbours and thereby minimize the dangers of dissension between the states.

In this essay, Hamilton addresses the inducements the States could have, if disunited, to make war upon each other. He starts by noting that territorial disputes have at all times been found one of the most fertile sources of hostility among nations and that this cause would exist among us in full force as we have a vast tract of unsettled territory within the boundaries of the United States. And there still are discordant and undecided claims between several of them them, and the dissolution of the Union would lay a foundation for similar claims between them all. It has been the prudent policy of Congress to appease this controversy, by prevailing upon the States to make cessions to the United States for the benefit of the whole. This has been so far accomplished as, under a continuation of the Union. … A dismemberment of the Confederacy, however, would revive this dispute, and would create others on the same subject.

In addition, the competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of contention. The States less favourably circumstanced would be desirous of escaping from the disadvantages of local situation, and of sharing in the advantages of their more fortunate neighbours. As a result, each State, or separate confederacy, would pursue a system of commercial policy peculiar to itself. This would occasion distinctions, preferences, and exclusions, which would beget discontent.

And this would be amplified by the public debt of the Union [which] would be a further cause of collision between the separate States or confederacies. How would it be possible to agree upon a rule of apportionment satisfactory to all? And these, as usual, would be exaggerated by the adverse interest of the parties. But, more importantly, there is, perhaps, nothing more likely to disturb the tranquillity of nations than their being bound to mutual contributions for any common object that does not yield an equal and coincident benefit. When all is said and done, we are not authorized to expect that a more liberal or more equitable spirit would preside over the legislations of the individual States hereafter, if unrestrained by any additional checks, than we have heretofore seen in too many instances disgracing their several codes.

When all is said and done, and you add up the chances of territorial disputes, commerce disputes, and debt disputes, you see that the conclusion is to be drawn, that America, if not connected at all, or only by the feeble tie of a simple league, offensive and defensive, would, by the operation of such jarring alliances, be gradually entangled in all the pernicious labyrinths of European politics and wars. In other words, if the states do not form a union that is a Confederate Republic, the dangers from dissensions between the states would be very real.

When you put it all together, it truly is a case of united we stand, and divided we fall. And if we don’t work together we divide, and then we fall.

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Having finished our discussion of the dangers of foreign force and influence that was taken up by John Jay in the last four essays (and the only four of his that we will cover in this thirty-six part series), we now begin our discussion of the dangers from dissensions between the states that is covered by Hamilton in Federalist No. 6 and Federalist No. 7.

Again addressing the people of the State of New York in the Independent Journal, Hamilton notes that republics, like monarchies, are administered by MEN and that men are subject to aversions, predilections, rivalships, and desires of unjust acquisitions. In addition, Hamilton notes that popular assemblies [are] frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent propensities and that it is well known that their
determinations are often governed by a few individuals in whom they place confidence and are, of course, liable to be tinctured by the passions and views of those individuals.

After all, have there not been as many wars founded upon commercial motives since that has become the prevailing system of nations, as were before occasioned by the cupidity of territory or dominion? Has Has not the spirit of commerce, in many instances, administered new incentives to the appetite, both for the one and for the other?

A student of history knows that Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage were all republics and were as often engaged in wars, both offensive and defensive, as the neighbouring monarchies. More recently, in European history, Venice and the provinces of Holland were often engaged in wars.

So what reason can we have to confide in those reveries which would seduce us into an expectation of peace and cordiality between the members of the present confederacy, in a state of separation? In a nutshell, none.

But if the states form a union that is a Confederate Republic and their constitution prevents the differences that neighbourhood occasions, in the words of Gabriel Bonnot do Mably, in Principes des Negociations, it will extinguish that secret jealousy which disposes all states to aggrandize themselves at the expense of their neighbours, and minimize the dangers of dissension between the states.

In other words, as a whole, our strengths will multiply and our weaknesses will divide and be conquered.

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Today we discuss Federalist No. 5. This is the fourth, and final, in the series of contributions by John Jay that we will be covering in our thirty-six part blog series. In this essay, Jay concludes his discussion of the dangers of foreign force and influence while writing to the people of the State of New York in the Independent.

In this piece Jay reminds us that weakness and divisions at home would invite dangers from abroad; and that nothing would tend more to secure us from them than union, strength, and good government within ourselves. In this essay, he reminds us that although it seems obvious to common sense that the people of such an island [as Great Britain] should be but one nation, we find that they were for ages divided into three, and that those three were almost constantly embroiled in quarrels and wars with one another. Then he asks would not the same thing happen if the people of America divide themselves into three or four nations. After all, would not similar jealousies arise, and be in like manner cherished? Instead of their being “joined in affection” and free from all apprehension of different “interests,” envy and jealousy would soon extinguish confidence and affection, and the partial interests of each confederacy, instead of the general interests of all America, would be the only objects of their policy and pursuits. Hence, like most other BORDERING nations, they would always be either involved in disputes and war, or live in the constant apprehension of them.

After spending time noting how likely this would be to happen when one of the confederacies became unquestionably more formidable than any of the others, Jay then goes on to note that the proposed confederacies [of the time] would be DISTINCT NATIONS and each of them would have its commerce with foreigners to regulate by distinct treaties; and as their productions and commodities are different and proper for different markets, so would those treaties be essentially different. Different commercial concerns must create different interests, and of course different degrees of political attachment to and connection with different foreign nations.

You’d have a situation where one confederacy was ready to declare war on a foreign nation for hostile actions, while another would want to do everything to preserve peace with its foremost trading partner. Just like neighbouring nations in Europe, acting under the impulse of opposite interests and unfriendly passions, would frequently be found taking different sides, so would the confederacies. What a nightmare! And given how much more easy it is to receive foreign fleets into our ports, and foreign armies into our country, than it is to persuade or compel them to depart, a situation of divided loyalties is the last situation you want to have on a continent.

So, to maximize safety, you need one nation, one Union. And for that Union to be true, the citizens must be of one mind and one heart. And, furthermore, so should the officials they represent to elect them. But that is a topic for other posts.

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Today we discuss Federalist No. 4. This is the third in the series of four contributions by John Jay that we will be covering in our thirty-six part blog series. In this essay, Jay again addresses the dangers from foreign force and influence while writing to the people of the State of New York.

In this essay, published in the Independent Journal, Jay notes that the safety of the people of America against dangers from FOREIGN force depends not only on their forbearing to give JUST causes of war to other nations, but also on their placing and continuing themselves in such a situation as not to INVITE hostility or insult. As Supply Management professionals, this essay hits close to home because Jay begins to explain this statement by noting that with France and with Britain and with most other European nations we are rivals in navigation and the carrying trade; and we shall deceive ourselves if we suppose that any of them will rejoice to see it flourish; for, as our carrying trade cannot increase without in some degree diminishing theirs, it is more their interest, and will be more their policy, to restrain than to promote it. Furthermore, in the trade to China and India, we interfere with more than one nation, inasmuch as it enables us to partake in advantages which they had in a manner monopolized, and as we thereby supply ourselves with commodities which we used to purchase from them.

The extension of our own commerce in our own vessels cannot give pleasure to any nations who possess territories on or near this continent, because the cheapness and excellence of our productions, added to the circumstance of vicinity, and the enterprise and address of our merchants and navigators, will give us a greater share in the advantages which those territories afford, than consists with the wishes or policy of their respective sovereigns.

Wow! Jay essentially predicted the global dominance, at least in GDP, that America, a country that did not yet exist, would attain 84 years before it happened! And he predicted the challenges America would face when it attained this dominance. Not bad. Plus, he realized that inducements to war may arise out of these circumstances. (Which they did. Thee was the Franco-American War which consisted of the French privateer attacks on U.S. Shipping, the War of 1812 brought partially about due to trade restrictions, the Mexican-American War, etc.)

As a result, he argues the need for a a union and a good national government … to put and keep the people of America in SUCH A SITUATION as, instead of INVITING war, will tend to repress and discourage it. A situation that consists in the best possible state of defence which can only be realized in a Union because one government can collect and avail itself of the talents and experience of the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union they may be found and move on uniform principles of policy. Plus, It can apply the resources and power of the whole to the defence of any particular part, and that more easily and expeditiously than State governments or separate confederacies can possibly do, for want of concert and unity of system. In addition, in the formation of treaties, it will regard the interest of the whole, and the particular interests of the parts as connected with that of the whole.

But, at least in this author’s view, the heart of the article appears in the last paragraph. Whatever may be our situation, whether firmly united under one national government, or split into a number of
confederacies, certain it is, that foreign nations will know and view it exactly as it is; and they will act toward us accordingly.

If they see that our national government is efficient and well administered, our trade prudently regulated, our militia properly
organized and disciplined, our resources and finances discreetly managed, our credit re-established, our people free, contented, and united, they will be much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke our resentment.

In other words, if a country wants to be safe, and free, it needs a well administered national government that effectively organizes its militia, discreetly manages its resources and finances, and prudently regulates trade. As a result, it is important to elect officials that maintain a militia that is large enough to defend the country from perspective threats (but not so large that the military becomes a driving force), know how to balance the budget (and maintain a good credit rating), and believe in fair global trade (which should not be too protectionist or completely free of tariffs, especially considering that tariffs are still a significant part of the tax-base in many nations). And while appropriately regulated and fair is open to interpretation, that interpretation needs to be congruent with what the majority of countries that participate in global trade (which today participate in the United Nations) more-or-less accept as reasonable. And just like an extremist government will not minimize the chance of hostility (and maximize the safety of its people), neither will an extremist candidate.

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