In our last post, we discussed how in Federalist No. 9 Hamilton addressed the subject of the Union as a safeguard against domestic faction and insurrection to the people of the State of New York. In Federalist No. 10, James Madison gives us his first contribution to the series while continuing to address the same subject in the New York Packet.

Madison starts off by noting that among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. This is because a government, without violating the principles on which it is based, will not fail to set a due value on any plan which provides a proper cure for the violence of faction.

Given that the instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal
diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished, it is vital that the subject be properly addressed and that the American constitutions do so and improve on the popular models for government, both ancient and modern.

There are essentially two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects. There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests. But where the first remedy is concerned, it is worse than the disease. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life. And the second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. Because, as long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As a result, the CAUSES of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its EFFECTS.

If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat
its sinister views by regular vote. But when a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government … enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. This could allow the faction to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression, which must be avoided.

Fortunately, a true republic varies from a democracy in two respects. First, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.

In the first case, we can assume that the elected representatives have the wisdom to best discern the true interest of their country and the patriotism and love and justice to see it through. And if that isn’t enough, when you extend the sphere of influence, you
take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common
motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to
discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. As a result, a rage … will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion
as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State.

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In Federalist No. 9, we again have Hamilton addressing the people of the State of New York in the Independent Journal, but this time he is addressing the union as a safeguard against domestic faction and insurrection as a follow-up to his piece on the consequences of hostilities between the states.

He begins the piece by stating that a FIRM Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and liberty of the States, as a barrier against domestic faction and insurrection. To stress this point, he begins with a discussion of how it is impossible to read the history of the petty republics of Greece and Italy without feeling sensations of horror and disgust at the distractions with which they were continually agitated and at the rapid succession of revolutions by which they were kept in a state of perpetual vibration between the extremes of tyranny and anarchy. These were, after all, republics, and since what is being proposed is a republic, one must address why the current instantiation of the republic will enable a FIRM Union between the states while previous instantiations did not.

The reason the current instantiation will not be subject to the distractions, agitations, tyranny, and anarchy of the republics of old is because the science of politics, however, like most other sciences, has received great improvement since the time these republics were created and the efficacy of various principles, not known to the ancients, is now well understood.

In particular, the regular distribution of power into distinct departments; the introduction of legislative balances and checks; the institution of courts composed of judges holding their offices during good behaviour; and the representation of the people in the legislature by deputies of their own election are wholly new discoveries, or have, at the very least, made progress towards perfection. They are means, and powerful means, by which the excellences of republican government may be retained and its imperfections lessened or avoided.

Hamilton then goes on to quote the French social commentator Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu, generally known as Montesquieu, who lived during the Enlightenment wand who articulated the theory of separation of powers which is a governance model for the state where it is divided into branches, each with separate and independent powers such that no branch has more power than the others, that is the basis of many of the constitutions in today’s republics and democracies.

This is because Montesquieu was one of the first enlightened thinkers to state that it is very probable that mankind would have been obliged at length to live constantly under the government of a single person, had they not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the internal advantages of a republican, together with the external force of a monarchical government. I mean a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC. Furthermore, the assemblage of societies that constitute a new one, capable of increasing, by means of new associations, till they arrive to such a degree of power as to be able to provide for the security of the united body is able to withstand an external force and may support itself without any internal corruptions. As a result, the form of
this society prevents all manner of inconveniences.

Furthermore, as noted by Hamilton, since the proposed constitution made the states constituent parts of the national sovereignty, this fully corresponds, in every rational import of the terms, with the idea of a federal government, we have a FIRM Union that should serve as a safeguard against domestic faction and insurrection.

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In Federalist No. 8, while addressing the people of the State of New York, Hamilton continues his discussion of the insufficiency of the present Confederation to preserve the Union by addressing the consequences of hostilities between the states.

Hamilton starts off by noting that war between the States, in the first period of their separate existence, would be accompanied with much greater distresses than it commonly is in those countries where regular military establishments have long obtained. This is because the states would lack the disciplined armies that render sudden conquests impracticable and prevent the rapid desolation which used to mark the progress of war prior to their introduction. The fortification they provide tends to mutually obstruct invasion. As a result, in these circumstances, the history of war is no longer a history of nations subdued and empires overturned, but of towns taken and retaken; of battles that decide nothing; of retreats more beneficial than victories; of much effort and little acquisition. But, in America, the scene would be altogether reversed and the populous States would, with little difficulty, overrun their less populous neighbours and war, therefore, would be desultory and predatory.

And while standing armies are not provided against in the Constitution being proposed, they must inevitably result from a dissolution of the Confederacy. Frequent war and constant
apprehension, which require a state of constant preparation, will infallibly produce them and the States or confederacies that made use of them [would gain] a superiority over their neighbours.

And we also have to consider that there is a wide difference, also, between military establishments in a country seldom exposed by its situation to internal
invasions, and in one which is often subject to them, and always apprehensive of them. In the latter, the perpetual menacings of danger oblige the government to be always prepared to repel it; its armies must be numerous enough for instant defense. And when armies become numerous, a continual state of war becomes inevitable.

But, if we are wise enough to preserve the Union we may for ages enjoy an advantage similar to that of an insulated situation instead of being prey to the means of defending ourselves against
the ambition and jealousy of each other.

In short, if a Union is not formed, the confederacy will soon fall apart as the smaller States get wiped out by the larger states in war. In other words, division only leads to tension, strife, and inevitably war but union leads to understanding and peace.

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Our last post began our discussion of the dangers from dissensions between the states that is covered by Hamilton in Federalist No. 6 and Federalist No. 7. In that post, we discussed how Hamilton noted that we had no reason to confide in those reveries which would seduce us into an expectation of peace and cordiality between the members of the present confederacy, in a state of separation given that men are subject to aversions, predilections, rivalships, and desires of unjust acquisitions and popular assemblies [are] frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment, jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent propensities. This has been proven again and again throughout history as Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage were all republics and were as often engaged in wars, both offensive and defensive, as the neighbouring monarchies.

However, if the stats form a union that is a Confederate Republic and their constitution prevents the differences that neighbourhood occasions, it will extinguish that secret jealousy which disposes all states to aggrandize themselves at the expense of their neighbours and thereby minimize the dangers of dissension between the states.

In this essay, Hamilton addresses the inducements the States could have, if disunited, to make war upon each other. He starts by noting that territorial disputes have at all times been found one of the most fertile sources of hostility among nations and that this cause would exist among us in full force as we have a vast tract of unsettled territory within the boundaries of the United States. And there still are discordant and undecided claims between several of them them, and the dissolution of the Union would lay a foundation for similar claims between them all. It has been the prudent policy of Congress to appease this controversy, by prevailing upon the States to make cessions to the United States for the benefit of the whole. This has been so far accomplished as, under a continuation of the Union. … A dismemberment of the Confederacy, however, would revive this dispute, and would create others on the same subject.

In addition, the competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of contention. The States less favourably circumstanced would be desirous of escaping from the disadvantages of local situation, and of sharing in the advantages of their more fortunate neighbours. As a result, each State, or separate confederacy, would pursue a system of commercial policy peculiar to itself. This would occasion distinctions, preferences, and exclusions, which would beget discontent.

And this would be amplified by the public debt of the Union [which] would be a further cause of collision between the separate States or confederacies. How would it be possible to agree upon a rule of apportionment satisfactory to all? And these, as usual, would be exaggerated by the adverse interest of the parties. But, more importantly, there is, perhaps, nothing more likely to disturb the tranquillity of nations than their being bound to mutual contributions for any common object that does not yield an equal and coincident benefit. When all is said and done, we are not authorized to expect that a more liberal or more equitable spirit would preside over the legislations of the individual States hereafter, if unrestrained by any additional checks, than we have heretofore seen in too many instances disgracing their several codes.

When all is said and done, and you add up the chances of territorial disputes, commerce disputes, and debt disputes, you see that the conclusion is to be drawn, that America, if not connected at all, or only by the feeble tie of a simple league, offensive and defensive, would, by the operation of such jarring alliances, be gradually entangled in all the pernicious labyrinths of European politics and wars. In other words, if the states do not form a union that is a Confederate Republic, the dangers from dissensions between the states would be very real.

When you put it all together, it truly is a case of united we stand, and divided we fall. And if we don’t work together we divide, and then we fall.

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