In Federalist No. 11, Hamilton returns to the helm in addressing the people of the State of New York in the Independent on the utility of the Union in respect to commercial relations and a navy. Starting with this essay, we start to move away from generic advantages of a republic over a democracy and a Union over a confederacy to a specific set of advantages, of relevance to the people, possessed by a republic Union.

Even in 1787, global trade was critical to economic growth. (In fact, in 1817, Congress did away with all internal taxes and relied solely on tariffs on imported goods to provide sufficient funds for running the government. The first income tax was not enacted until 1862 to support the Civil War. Before this, taxes were limited to a few commodities, starting with sugar in 1764 and stamps in 1765.) In the 1600s and 1700s, European countries captured profits of 200% to 300% by way of long-distance trade with the Americas and the east. In fact, at one point in time, the British East India Company was an imperial power in its own right, with its own military! Thus, commercial relations would be critical to the rise, and acceptance, of America.

Hamilton starts off by noting that there are appearances to authorize a supposition that the adventurous spirit, which distinguishes the commercial character of America, has already excited uneasy sensations in several of the maritime powers of Europe. They seem to be apprehensive of our too great interference in that carrying trade. There is thus reason to believe that some countries may favour the policy of fostering divisions among us, and of depriving us, as far as possible, of an ACTIVE COMMERCE as this would prevent our interference in their
navigation, [prevent our interference in their] monopolizing the profits of our trade, and clip the wings by which we might soar to a dangerous greatness.

If we continue united, we may counteract a policy so unfriendly to our prosperity in a variety of ways. By prohibitory regulations, extending … throughout the States, we may oblige foreign countries to bid against each other, for the privileges of our markets. In addition, a further resource for influencing the conduct of European nations toward us, in this respect, would arise from the establishment of a federal navy. There can be no doubt that the continuance of the Union … would … create a navy which, if it could not vie with those of the great maritime powers, would at least be of respectable weight. This would create, since just a few ships sent to reinforce either side in a third-party maritime conflict, would be sufficient to decide the fate of a campaign and this creates a situation so favourable would enable us to bargain with great advantage for commercial privileges. Thus, by a steady adherence to the Union we may … become the arbiter of Europe in America. It is arguable that under a vigorous national government, the natural strength and resources of the country, directed to a common interest, would baffle all the combinations of European jealousy to restrain our growth.

In addition, an unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will advance the trade of each by an interchange of their respective productions … and the veins of commerce in every part will be replenished. As a result, the aggregate balance of the commerce of the United States would bid fair to be much more favourable than that of the thirteen States without union. And, then, the thirteen States, bound together in a strict and indissoluble Union, concurrent in erecting one great American system will be superior to the control of all transatlantic force or influence, and able to dictate the terms of the connection between the old and the new world!

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In our last post, we discussed how in Federalist No. 9 Hamilton addressed the subject of the Union as a safeguard against domestic faction and insurrection to the people of the State of New York. In Federalist No. 10, James Madison gives us his first contribution to the series while continuing to address the same subject in the New York Packet.

Madison starts off by noting that among the numerous advantages promised by a well-constructed Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its tendency to break and control the violence of faction. This is because a government, without violating the principles on which it is based, will not fail to set a due value on any plan which provides a proper cure for the violence of faction.

Given that the instability, injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have, in truth, been the mortal
diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished, it is vital that the subject be properly addressed and that the American constitutions do so and improve on the popular models for government, both ancient and modern.

There are essentially two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects. There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests. But where the first remedy is concerned, it is worse than the disease. But it could not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to political life. And the second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be unwise. Because, as long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As a result, the CAUSES of faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in the means of controlling its EFFECTS.

If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to defeat
its sinister views by regular vote. But when a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular government … enables it to sacrifice to its ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other citizens. This could allow the faction to concert and carry into effect schemes of oppression, which must be avoided.

Fortunately, a true republic varies from a democracy in two respects. First, the delegation of the government, in the latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of country, over which the latter may be extended.

In the first case, we can assume that the elected representatives have the wisdom to best discern the true interest of their country and the patriotism and love and justice to see it through. And if that isn’t enough, when you extend the sphere of influence, you
take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common
motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to
discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. As a result, a rage … will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a particular member of it; in the same proportion
as such a malady is more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire State.

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