In Federalist No. 27, Hamilton continues his consideration of the idea of restraining the legislative authority in regard to the common defense. In this particular essay, there is no substitute for his words.
Unless we presume at the same time that the powers of the general
government will be worse administered than those of the State government, there seems to be no room for the presumption of
ill-will, disaffection, or opposition in the people. I believe it may be laid down as a general rule that their confidence in and
obedience to a government will commonly be proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration.
It will be sufficient here to remark,
that until satisfactory reasons can be assigned to justify an opinion, that the federal government is likely to be administered in
such a manner as to render it odious or contemptible to the people, there can be no reasonable foundation for the supposition
that the laws of the Union will meet with any greater obstruction from them, or will stand in need of any other methods to
enforce their execution, than the laws of the particular members.
The plan reported by the convention, by extending the authority of the federal head to the individual citizens of the several
States, will enable the government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each, in the execution of its laws
man who will pursue, by his own reflections, the consequences of this situation, will perceive that there is good ground to
calculate upon a regular and peaceable execution of the laws of the Union, if its powers are administered with a common
share of prudence.