In Federalist No. 22, Hamilton continues to discuss other defects of the present Confederation.

He starts with a discussion of the regulation of commerce. He concludes that it is indeed evident, on the most superficial view, that there is no object, either as it respects the interests of trade or finance, that more strongly demands a federal superintendence. This is because the want of it has already operated as a bar to the formation of beneficial treaties with foreign powers, and has given occasions of dissatisfaction between the States.

He then goes on to note that in commerce, and other matters, the interfering and unneighbourly regulations of some States, contrary to the true spirit of the Union, have, in different instances, given just cause of umbrage and complaint to others, and it is to be feared that examples of this nature, if not restrained by a national control, would be multiplied and extended till they became not less serious sources of animosity and discord than injurious impediments to the intercourse between the different parts of the Confederacy. This not only prevents the creation, and adoption, of trade treaties but also lays the foundation for civil unrest, as discussed in previous essays.

Then we have the harsh reality that the power of raising armies, by the most obvious construction of the articles of the Confederation, is merely a power of making requisitions upon the States for quotas of men. This has resulted in a competition between the States which created a kind of auction for men where they outbid each other till bounties grew to an enormous and insupportable size. It should be clear that this method of raising troops is not more unfriendly to economy and vigour than it is to an equal distribution of the burden as it was a regular occurrence that States were delinquent in the supplies of men, the supplies of money, or both.

This in turn illustrates the absurdity of the right of equal suffrage among the states in the Confederation. Every idea of proportion and every rule of fair representation conspire to condemn a principle, which gives to Rhode Island an equal weight in the scale of
power with Massachusetts, or Connecticut, or New York. Its operation contradicts the fundamental maxim of republican government, which requires that the sense of the majority should prevail.

To give a minority a negative upon the
majority (which is always the case where more than a majority is requisite to a decision), is, in its tendency, to subject the
sense of the greater number to that of the lesser.

And to require unanimity is even worse. The necessity of unanimity in public bodies, or of something approaching towards it, has been founded upon a
supposition that it would contribute to security. But its real operation is to embarrass the administration, to destroy the energy
of the government, and to substitute the pleasure, caprice, or artifices of an insignificant, turbulent, or corrupt junto, to the
regular deliberations and decisions of a respectable majority. This is because, in those emergencies of a nation, in which the goodness or badness, the weakness or strength of its government, is of the greatest importance, there is commonly a necessity for action.
The public business must, in some way or other, go forward.

And then there is the want of a judiciary power. Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound and define their true meaning and operation. Thus, the treaties of the United
States, to have any force at all, must be considered as part of the law of the land. This can only happen if they can be submitted, in the lat result, to one SUPREME TRIBUNAL that is instituted under the same authority which forms the treaties themselves.

When all is considered, we conclude the necessity of laying the foundations of our national government deeper than in the mere sanction of delegated authority. The fabric of American empire ought to rest on the sold basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE.

In Federalist No. 21, Hamilton returns to the helm to discuss other defects of the present Confederation. His goal is to proceed in the enumeration of the most important of those defects which have hitherto disappointed our hopes from the system established among ourselves.

The next most palpable defect of the subsisting Confederation, is total want of a SANCTION to its laws. The United States, as now composed, have no powers to exact obedience, or punish disobedience to their resolutions. There is no express delegation of authority to them to use force against delinquent members. As a result, the Confederation provided us with another example of an extraordinary spectacle of a government destitute even of the shadow of constitutional power to enforce the execution of its own laws. This puts it in a weak position relative to the powers of Europe.

The want of a mutual guaranty of the State governments is another capital imperfection in the federal plan. This is a rather sad state of affairs as, without a guarantee, the assistance to be derived from the Union in repelling those domestic dangers which may sometimes threaten the existence of the State constitutions, must be renounced. Usurpation may rear its crest in each State, and trample upon the liberties of the people, while the national government could legally do nothing more than behold its encroachments
with indignation and regret.

The principle of regulating the contributions of the States to the common treasury by QUOTAS is another fundamental error in the Confederation. Not only does this result in an inadequate supply of the national exigencies, but it can weaken the overall economy. IN addition, since the wealth of nations depends upon an infinite variety of causes, this implies that there can be no common measure of national wealth and, of course, no general or stationary rule by which the ability of a state to pay taxes can be determined. As a result, the attempt to regulate the contributions of the members of a confederacy by any such rule, cannot fail to be productive of glaring inequality and extreme oppression. The inequality would of itself be sufficient in America to work the eventual destruction of the Union. The reality is that there is no method of steering clear of this inconvenience, but by authorizing the national government to raise its own revenues in its own way.

The suggestion put forth is that these taxes should be levied on articles of consumption, as they contain in their own nature a security against excess. They prescribe their own limit, which cannot be exceeded without defeating the end proposed.

Federalist No. 20 sees Hamilton and Madison continue to address the ongoing issue of the insufficiency of the present confederation to preserve the union.

In this essay, they discuss the United Netherlands, a confederacy of republics, or rather of aristocracies of a very remarkable texture that confirm all the lessons derived so far. Their review of the celebrated Belgic confederacy finds that while, on paper, everything sounds like the confederacy should be strong, in reality, there is imbecility in the government; discord among the provinces; foreign influence and indignities; a
precarious existence in peace, and peculiar calamities from war because it is not a even a true confederacy of republics, but a confederacy of aristocracies that ultimately answers to the stadtholder, an executive magistrate who is also a hereditary prince.

Then they discuss the union of Utrecht, which also reposes an authority in the States-General, seemingly sufficient to
secure harmony, but the jealousy in each province renders the practice very different from the theory.

From here they end the piece with a discussion of the province of Holland, the the wealth and influence that allow her to furnish quotas, without waiting for other provinces in the union, and then obtain reimbursements from others by frequent deputations, sometimes at the point of the bayonet. Furthermore, it was often compelled to overleap its constitutional bounds. This demonstrates that a weak constitution must necessarily terminate in dissolution, for want of proper powers, or the usurpation of powers requisite for the public safety.

But regardless of your view, the reality is that, in Holland, and the other provinces in the weak union to which it belongs, the unhappy people seem to be now suffering from popular convulsions, from dissensions among the states, and from the
actual invasion of foreign arms, the crisis of their destiny.

That’s why Hamilton and Madison make no apology for dwelling so long on the contemplation of the federal precedents. Experience is the oracle of
truth; and where its responses are unequivocal, they ought to be conclusive and sacred. The important truth, which it
unequivocally pronounces in the present case, is that a sovereignty over sovereigns, a government over governments, a
legislation for communities, as contradistinguished from individuals, as it is a solecism in theory, so in practice it is
subversive of the order and ends of civil polity, by substituting VIOLENCE in place of LAW, or the destructive COERCION
of the SWORD in place of the mild and salutary COERCION of the MAGISTRACY. That’s why one union, one nation, is required.

In Federalist No. 19, Hamilton and Madison continue to address the ongoing issue of the insufficiency of the present confederation to preserve the union.

Analyzing the history of Germany, they note that if the nation happens, on any emergency, to be more united by the necessity of self-defense, its situation is still deplorable. This is because military preparations must be preceded by so many tedious discussions, arising from the jealousies, pride, separate views,
and clashing pretensions of sovereign bodies, that before the diet can settle the arrangements, the enemy are in the field; and
before the federal troops are ready to take it, are retiring into winter quarters.

Then, analyzing the history of Donawerth in Swabia, and a period in the thirty years’ war in particular in which friction developed between the Lutheran majority and the Catholic minority when the Duke of Bavaria decided rest control from the Abb de St. Croix, they note that the city was in part of a feeble and precarious Union that we must avoid. The only reason the region did not fall into pieces entirely was that the members were week, and willing to accept the vast weight and influence of the emperor. But the reality was that it was a feeble and precarious Union with a repellant quality, incident to the nature of sovereignty that only served to prevent any reform whatever.

Furthermore, analyzing the Swiss cantons, which scarcely amount to a confederacy, which have no common treasury; no common troops even in war; no common coin; no common judicatory; nor any other
common mark of sovereignty they find that they are kept together by the peculiarity of their topographical position; by their individual weakness and insignificancy; by the fear of powerful neighbours; by the few sources of contention among a people
of such simple and homogeneous manners; by their joint interest in their dependent possessions … and by the necessity of some regular and permanent provision for accommodating disputes among the cantons.. But if the dispute cannot be resolved by a tribunal of impartial parties, or one or more cantons do not adhere to the definitive sentence that the impartial tribunal devises, then under the treaty of 1683, the Duke of Savoy, can interpose as mediator in disputes between the cantons, and to employ force, if necessary, against the contumacious party. The lesson is clear – whatever efficacy the union may have had in ordinary cases, it appears that the moment
a cause of difference sprang up, capable of trying its strength, it failed.

In other words, history has shown us again and again that weak confederacies don’t last. A strong union is essential.

In Federalist No. 18, Hamilton and Madison team up to address the ongoing issue of the insufficiency of the present confederation to preserve the union.

One of the key takeaways from this essay is summed up in these words a weak government, when not at war, is ever agitated by internal dissentions, so those never fail to bring on fresh calamities from abroad. As proof of the pudding they offer, they recount a history of Greece and how the relatively weak union they formed eventually broke down as rival city states went to war. Had Greece … been united by a stricter confederation, and perservered in her union, she would have never have worn the chains of Macedon, and might have proved a barrier to the vast projects of Rome.

The majority of the essay is spent recounting the histories of the Grecian republics, and the battle between Athens and Sparta and the Achaean league in particular, because it teaches more than one lesson. It emphatically illustrates the tendency of federal bodies rather to anarchy among the members, than to tyranny in the head. As a result, there should be little concern about the Union trying to abuse the power it is given. The essay is a good read, and a great refresher on some of the finer points of historical inquiry, but if you’re in a hurry you can skip the history lesson and get right to the takeaway – a strong Union is always better than a weak confederacy.