In Federalist No. 27, Hamilton continues his consideration of the idea of restraining the legislative authority in regard to the common defense. In this particular essay, there is no substitute for his words.

Unless we presume at the same time that the powers of the general
government will be worse administered than those of the State government, there seems to be no room for the presumption of
ill-will, disaffection, or opposition in the people. I believe it may be laid down as a general rule that their confidence in and
obedience to a government will commonly be proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration.

It will be sufficient here to remark, that until satisfactory reasons can be assigned to justify an opinion, that the federal government is likely to be administered in such a manner as to render it odious or contemptible to the people, there can be no reasonable foundation for the supposition
that the laws of the Union will meet with any greater obstruction from them, or will stand in need of any other methods to enforce their execution, than the laws of the particular members.

The plan reported by the convention, by extending the authority of the federal head to the individual citizens of the several States, will enable the government to employ the ordinary magistracy of each, in the execution of its laws

Any man who will pursue, by his own reflections, the consequences of this situation, will perceive that there is good ground to calculate upon a regular and peaceable execution of the laws of the Union, if its powers are administered with a common share of prudence.

In Federalist No. 26, Hamilton considers the idea of restraining the legislative authority in regard to the common defense.

This particular essay has one of the most interesting starts:

IT WAS a thing hardly to be expected that in a popular revolution the minds of men should stop at that happy mean which marks the salutary boundary between POWER and PRIVILEGE, and combines the energy of government with the security of private rights. The concern herein is that A failure in this delicate and important point is the great source of the inconveniences we experience and while we may try change after change within such a system, we shall never be likely to make any material change for the better.

In this piece, in which Hamilton argues that the idea of restraining the legislative authority, in the means of providing for the national defense, is one of those refinements which owe their origin to a zeal for liberty more ardent than enlightened, he states that if experience has not wrought a deep and solemn conviction in the public mind, that greater energy of government is essential to the welfare and prosperity of the community before going on to give us more history lessons.

He gives us the example of England, where authority of the monarch was almost unlimited after the Norman Conquest, until the revolution of 1688 where English liberty again reigned triumphant with the introduction of a bill of rights that included an article that said the raising or keeping a standing army within the kingdom in time of peace, UNLESS WITH THE CONSENT OF PARLIAMENT, was against law. In that kingdom, no security against the danger of standing armies was thought requisite, beyond a prohibition of their being raised or kept up by the mere authority of the executive magistrate. This caused the armies to swell to massive numbers, almost 30,000 under James the II, which gave the monarch too much power. As a result, England needed this rule. However, this does not justify a similar provision in the US Constitution as there are no monarchs, or representatives thereof, who have great power that can be abused as all power in a republic rests in the hands of the people. The people elect the legislature, and the legislature, on their behalf, determines the need for standing armies and military strength. Plus, the fact that the proposed constitution restrains the appropriations of money for military purposes to the period of two years means that the legislature of the United States will be OBLIGED, by this provision, once at least in every two years, to deliberate upon the propriety of keeping a military force on foot; to come to a new resolution on the point; and to declare their sense of the matter, by a formal vote in the face of their constituents. Thus, no further restraint is needed.

In Federalist No. 25, Hamilton continues his consideration of the powers necessary to the common defense, which he began in the last instalment where he determined that restraints upon the discretion of the legislature in respect to military establishments in time of peace, would be improper to be imposed as here has been a constant necessity for keeping small garrisons on our Western frontier and that alone justifies the need for standing armies, even in peace-time.

In this piece he noted that the territories of Britain, Spain, and of the Indian nations … encircle the Union from Maine to Georgia and that the danger, though in different degrees, is therefore common. And the means of guarding against it ought, in like manner, to be the objects of common councils and of a common treasury.

If power was instead to be imbued in State governments, rivalships could form, due to the inherent love of power possessed by any assembly, and in any contest between the federal head and one of its members, the people will be most apt to unite with their local government. Plus, if the ambition of the members should be stimulated by the separate and independent possession of military forces, it would afford too strong a temptation and too great a facility to them to make enterprises upon, and finally to subvert, the constitutional authority of the Union. As a result, the liberty of the people would be less safe in this state of things than in that which left the national forces in the hands of the national government.

And if the need for a national army under the control of the federal government is not yet clear, we can obviate this consequence by noting that the United States would then exhibit the most extraordinary spectacle which the world has yet seen, that of a nation incapacitated by its Constitution to prepare for defense, before it was actually invaded.

And are we paying too much? Hard to say, but this animated video of The American Dream is both interesting and enlightening!

All I know is that, at least where Wall Street is concerned, I agree with Andrew Jackson The Bank is trying to kill me. Maybe it’s time for another veto of the bank’s charter!

Think about it when you cast your vote next month.

In Federalist No. 24, Hamilton further considers the powers necessary to the common defense, and, in particular, the specific objection that proper provision has not been made against the existence of standing armies in time of peace. In Hamilton’s view, this objection rests on weak and unsubstantial foundations, and this is easy to show.

In the proposed constitution, the whole power of raising armies was lodged in the LEGISLATURE, not in the EXECUTIVE; that this legislature
was to be a popular body, consisting of the representatives of the people periodically elected. Furthermore, restraints upon the discretion of the legislature in respect to military establishments in time of peace, would be improper to be imposed, and if imposed, from the necessities of society, would be unlikely to be observed.

Furthermore, previous to the Revolution, and ever since the peace, there has been a constant necessity for keeping small garrisons on our
Western frontier. No person can doubt that these will continue to be indispensable. In addition, If we should not be willing to be exposed, in a naked and defenseless condition, to the insults and encroachments of Britain and Spain, we should find it expedient to increase our frontier garrisons in some ratio to the force by which our Western settlements might be annoyed.

Thus, standing armies will be needed in times of peace, and it will be up to the Legislature to determine how big they need to be.