Monthly Archives: August 2024

PROCUREMENT ARE NOT GUINEA PIGS!

Now, a lot of things grind my gears, but if you really want the doctor to fly into a rage, suggest, as this article did, that Procurement, the most critical function in the modern organization, and the one experiencing the greatest dearth of talent, should be used as a guinea pigs … and especially so for bullcr@p AI!

This is the kind of idiocy that, in olden times, would not only get you fired on the spot for suggesting it, but blacklisted by your employer and any other executive who hung out in the same private clubs. No one wants a reckless fool that could tank their business, earnings, and lifestyle … and that’s the last thing a rich, lazy, private club (and private jet) executive wants to happen. (And the last thing your team wants to happen as you put the blame on them and expect them to clean up a mess that the systems you imposed created.)

If you’re going to experiment with AI, especially if you’re just doing it so you won’t miss the bandwagon as it races by (because, as we’ve said before, it has no brakes and no steering if its the Gen-AI bandwagon), pick a function and a supporting task that is much (much) less critical where utter, abysmal failure won’t have any significant business impact … not a function where one mistake in even the most mundane of activities can halt your multi-million dollar production line for weeks (or months) and possibly bankrupt you!

Zombie Companies Exist Too!

Last week the one and only Dr. Tony Bridger, one of the world’s leading spend gurus, said that the correct term for “walking dead companies” is Zombie companies, and I had to correct him.

Historically, a person was walking dead when they had received a mortal wound, infection, poison, or radiation dose and it was just a matter of time before they died. But they weren’t dead yet, and there was always a chance (albeit not a good one) they could survive if they got medical treatment fast enough to stem the bleeding and repair enough of the damage, fight the infection with a miracle drug, get injected with the anti-venom, or get quickly decontaminated and receive enough red blood cell transfusions to have a fighting chance (although, admittedly, not a very good one).

Similarly, a walking dead company is a company that is on the path to insolvency (or acquisition on someone else’s terms if it’s lucky) because of the situation it is in, which is usually because of critical mistakes that were made in the past and still being made today. If such a company suddenly stopped making all identifiable mistakes, found a way to stem the bleeding (of cash), and mitigate some of those past mistakes, there’s still a chance it could survive. It might not be the company it wanted to be, but if it made it to break even, maybe it could find a new direction and a new chance to be great down the road.

In comparison, a zombie company is one that is already dead, and has been dead for years, but refuses to die, usually because of the stubbornness of one or two founders/leaders who believe if they make it just one more year, even though they refuse to do anything different from what they have been doing for years, the company will magically take off. They maintain a heretical, fervent belief that it just needs “more time”, just like the Gen-AI zealots believe it just needs “more cores”, and the American voters think they have a real choice (when, in a two party system, they don’t … or at least won’t until the Super PACs, which give money to both parties to ensure that whomever wins will support their core agenda, are made illegal and eliminated).

You can tell these companies because, in our space,

  • they have been around more than five years, and usually more than seven (before COVID and since the second last M&A frenzy in the late teens when money flowed freely)
  • they have less than 10 (FT) employees if they are primarily a point/module-based solution, and less than 20 (FT) employees
  • their customer count hasn’t increased significantly (i.e. has not increased by more than 10% to 20%) in at least 3 years, i.e. if they’ve managed to sign new customers, they’ve usually lost almost as many
  • they don’t do any marketing whatsoever beyond email campaigns and more often than not the copyright on their website is a year (or more) out of date
  • none of the major analyst firms or analysts have given them much attention in years

And, as any consultant, analyst, or partner who they attempted to engage or who tried to help them can tell you, the situation the company is in is unrecoverable or a non-starter.

(So while the doctor will be giving you

  • a two-part series on what you can do to avoid the graveyard if you admit to some of the dumb company mistakes and
  • an eight-part series on what you can do to avoid the graveyard if you are willing to admit you are making some of the dead company walking mistakes

he will not be doing any follow ups to this article.)

Why are they zombie companies? There are a lot of reasons the doctor can point to, and he’ll include a few examples in this article, but it all boils down to this:

  1. most of these companies are owned by one to three founders/partners who control the company and
  2. the refuse to admit that they need help, or if they admit they need help, they refuse to either do what is necessary, and often won’t even admit they need to do something different to get help

And since I know THE REVELATOR loves details, some examples include, but are definitely not limited to:

  • their messaging will be awful and their marketing strategy non-existent, and even if multiple people outright tell them that, including analysts and (potential) partners who want to help them, the founder/partner will either insist it’s just fine or that they need to keep it in house
  • they couldn’t sell a space heater to a freezing American stuck in Alaska, but won’t hire a full time sales person on salary because “a great salesperson should work only on commission and want to sell our product because it’s so great”, even though a sales person would need to sell a deal a month to make a decent salary on the commission on a 50K modular sale, and since it takes about a year to build a solid pipeline, that sales person is apparently supposed to starve for the first year (with zero stake in the company) … because of future potential
  • they admit they need help tweaking the product to be more appealing to a wider audience, but won’t pay for consulting because the budget is too tight — unless the consultant works on “referrals” … but that’s presales, not product, and not what the consultant they need is going to be any good at, so they don’t get any help … ever!
  • etc.

the doctor could go on, but he won’t, because there’s no point. At the end of the day, these zombie companies desperately need help, and even if they admit it in some capacity, they won’t get it because they don’t want “IP” to leave their “4 walls” (even though they have very little they need to protect as the core of most solutions that implement a core function is about 80% the same), or, usually don’t want to pay for it (because that would either require investment, a loan, and/or ownership dilution … and sales, which they are not getting and haven’t gotten in years, should pay for everything).

The founders/partners are the problem, they can’t be removed, and they’ll stubbornly keep sailing on the edge of the massive whirlpool that’s sure to swallow their ship to the bottom of the sea until they lose that one key customer (that accounts for a significant part of their revenues or referrals to replace the customers they keep losing) or one of the partners becomes unable to continue, at which time the helm will be unmanned and the whirlpool will win. It’s unfortunate for all involved, and it is even more unfortunate that, since they are private, you can’t do hostile takeovers of the ones with good tech that will soon be lost to time.

So that’s it. Zombie companies exist and they can’t be helped and you want to steer further from them then dead companies walking. At least in the case of a dead company walking, if that company admits it and charts a turn around course, it could end up being an okay bet, especially if they can reach profitability or are likely to get acquired intact by a new investor. But the only future for a zombie company, unable to acquire the brains it needs to survive, is to eventually shrivel up and fall apart and return to the dirt from which it came.

Don’t Fall for the Buzzwords!

In fact, as per our 10 words or phrases to ban from an RFP response last year (Part I and Part II), you should ban all buzzwords from not only your RFPs but from your communications with potential vendors. They should be counted as strikes against the vendor and the baseball rule applied (3 strikes and you’re out).

Even though you might be attracted to “social”, “green”, “(Gen-)AI” (which you shouldn’t be, since it’s been proven that all the emergent property claims are false), “autonomous”, “intake-to-“, “discovery”, “multiplier”, and “insights”, etc., you need to remember that the vendors know this and are using as many of these terms as possible to lure you to them and convince you they have the best solution, even if all they have are the best buzzwords.

After all, they know that you are under pressure by your consumers, colleagues, and CEO to be “social”, “green”, and “autonomous” and that, to do that, you need “insights” and “discovery” and that you are all getting swept up in the “intake-to” and “(Gen-)AI” hype-cycles and that you believe it will get you “multipliers” and “delightful” experiences.

So they are preying on your pressures, your desires, and your fears of missing the hype-cycle and being left-behind, even though these “hype” cycles are often literal — all “hype”, no “substance”. Social value is a buzzword, nothing more. Social value is not in applications, it is in awards and actions. The same with “green”. At the end of the day, all SaaS platforms are equally green (unless they use Gen-AI, because then they use ten time the computing resources to do a simple task), they all minimize the need for on-site hardware, but they all eat up cloud compute cycles. The green comes in the decisions you make with them.

Automation is important, but “autonomous” is only useful for tactical e-paper pushing, not for strategic decision making — good computational algorithms can compute odds (and make recommendations) based on the data presented, but it cannot make decisions, and the odds are only as good as the data. “Insights” are only achieved on good data … and if you don’t have that “good” data, you can be damn sure the vendor doesn’t. “Discovery” is always limited to data at your disposal or the vendor’s disposal. If you don’t have the supplier in your database and the vendor doesn’t have the supplier in its community database, there’s no way it’s going to be “discovered”. Also, “intake-to-procure” is useless if you don’t have the solution in place to actually “procure”. As we pointed out in our piece on marketplace madness, intake-to-orchestrate on its own is useless, and a real, modern procurement solution actually has “intake” built in. (So if yours doesn’t, maybe upgrade it to a better solution instead of paying six-figures a year for a view into your data that doesn’t actually add any value.)

Which brings us to the (Gen)-AI hype-cycle. It’s all hype, no substance. There are no valid uses for Gen-AI and even less uses than none in Procurement and it’s all a fallacy considering that even in a decade it won’t even have a 50/50 chance of being truly dependable at the expected rate of improvement. (And if a 200M investment into a new model culminated in the great insight that we should eat one rock a day, maybe it’s time to bury this failed offshoot of AI now before more Billions are wasted. After all, if those Billions were invested in the public school system, that would more than double the current national budget — think of how much better educated your children would be with that increase in funding. Despite the bullcr@p, the future lies in Human Intelligence (HI!), which needs to be nurtured, not abandoned.)

In other words, don’t get led astray by the buzzwords. Value comes from real products that solve real problems whose solutions provide real value to your organization. If the vendor can’t explain that in plain English, then you can be fairly certain the vendor doesn’t have anything truly valuable and you should move on.

Why Do Successful Solution Providers Ruin Everything By Becoming Tech Companies?

Jon THE REVELATOR asked this very important question in a article over on Procure Insights in the spring.

And, of course, the doctor answered.

Simply put, the reason they ruin everything is because they fail to understand that, in Finance and Procurement, no one wants tech or software … no one. This is true from a professional and a personal point of view.

Professionally, they want whatever will make their jobs easier. They don’t care if its software, a physical tool, outsourced labour, or an intern. They want to get the job done, fulfill the requirements of the business, make money, and do it with as little effort on their part as possible. If that’s software, great. If the money is there and it’s outsourcing everything at an affordable dollar value that will generate a return, they’d be just as happy (if not happier) to do that (as then they wouldn’t be stuck fighting with a tool when it didn’t do exactly what they wanted it to do exactly the way they wanted it done).

Personally, and this is what software companies don’t get, Finance and Procurement people want software EVEN less. 140,000 people don’t flock to CES (Consumer Electronics Show) for the software — they flock for the cool new gadgets that will entertain them. The gadgets may be software powered, but they don’t care about that. It’s the fun factor. And, let’s face it, Finance and Procurement software IS NOT FUN!

Has anyone ever wanted a word processor? A piece of tax software? A scripting tool? NO. Writers want an e-type writer, they don’t care what that is. People don’t even want to do their taxes, so they definitely don’t desire software that will help them do other people’s taxes too. Coders like scripting, but they are usually doing it to get a job done more quickly or elegantly or to have (sometimes illegal hacking) fun as it’s their version of entertainment. They don’t want your tool — they want what it does.

Gamers want video games, but they want the experience, they don’t want to see the “software”. The game console sells, not the code that powers it.

That’s why successful solution providers, who forgot it is all about solutions that deliver ROI to the business, ruin everything when they become tech companies. Tech is for consumers, not for business. Valuable ROI-generating solutions are for business.

Is Coupa’s Third Act Its Final Act?

After Sunday’s lyrical Coupa Cabana, you knew something was coming. But you probably weren’t sure what, since the tone was a bit different than the Coupa songs the doctor used to publish back in the day when it was Coupa Time and he sung the praises of the Coupa Store (and even gave the farmers their own Hoe-Down so they knew that even they could embrace the tech).

In comparison, the Coupa Cabana is pretty lamentful, but not entirely unexpected, as the doctor did foreshadow this 18 years ago (yes, eighteen years ago — feels like coverage has been ongoing for my whole life) in his tribute to Procurement Independence at the Coupa Cabana Cafe. (For a brief instant, Coupa completely changed the game, and when you change the game … )

Back in the Day, before this make margins multiply marketing malarky, and well before the Business Spend Management of its second act, it had a, now long forgotten, first act where Davie wanted to change the Procurement world with an affordable user friendly e-Procurement solution that could be used by anyone anywhere in any assembly.

And that was Coupa’s first act. A pure multi-tenant SaaS application that could be licensed for low five figures by any organization that wanted it, turned on with the flip of the switch, easily populated with an xml or csv upload, integrated with your favourite punchout sites, and rolled out to every single employee in the organization, with appropriate controls to make sure they could only request what they had access to and buyers had the ability to accept, modify, or reject as needed. That’s right. Real “intake” back in 2006 with a real procurement app to back it up. (And built in an unassuming, affordable, non-glitzy strip-mall office, down the street from the Amazon Motel, where it didn’t cost a million dollars to dance on the roof.) In the slang of the day, it was sick.

And if you were small and couldn’t afford a few grand a month, or wanted to try it for free, no big deal — a stripped down version was offered as open source, and as long as you were technically inclined (and knew Ruby on Rails), you could download it, install it, play with it, and even use it if you wanted to. (It was way more economical to get a SaaS license then devote your own IT staff to supporting it, but the free version allowed you to verify that it would work for you and wasn’t silicon snake oil.)

It was simple, but effective, and, most importantly, game-changing. And investors noticed. And they invested, but with big dollar signs in their eyes (which they knew the rich and filthy would pay). And this meant bringing in a visionary with even bigger dollar signs in his eyes. Davie was ditched (and Noah was set adrift on the ark) and Robbie was bought in to lead the Coupa Factory for the second act.

Robbie dreamed of a day where a client could manage all spend through Coupa, making it indispensible, and bringing in the Salesforce sized contracts he used to. But all Coupa did was core e-procurement, so off on an acquisition spree he went. And a spree it was. By 2021, in an effort to build a platform that could do everything, it had made twenty (20) acquisitions across the Source-to-Pay spectrum, including a couple in Finance (Bellin) and Supply Chain (Llamasoft). And while it still doesn’t quite fulfill the entirety of Business Spend Management (because it doesn’t do payroll, and doesn’t do advanced financial planning), it can literally track most of the dollars that flow through a third party if enough modules are obtained (and enough dollars are shelled out).

But you need a lot, which costs more than all but the largest enterprises can afford, and it has to be appropriately configured, which requires expertise that few have.

And this is the crux. While acquisitions boosted Coupa capability and talent in the early days, lending credence to the promise of Business Spend Management (which later became known as
B6llsh!t Spend Management in some private circles) which never fully materialized (and still causes some of us to twitch, but not in a good way), as time went on, the inevitable happened. The top tier talent they acquired, when their options vested or hiring bonuses became non-repayable, moved on or retired from Procurement on the windfall. (Were they the lucky ones?) And the majority of the talent that knew how to not only enhance, but help a client take full advantage of their top tier advanced spend analysis (Spend360), sourcing optimization (Trade Extensions), or supply chain planning & optimization solution (Llamasoft) moved on (as did their 1st employee and CTO). This also happened at their other 17 acquisitions, and I’m betting at this point that for most of the advanced features in most of their advanced modules, there are at most 2 people who can demo them. And none that can even demo half the end-to-end Coupa solution.

However, as you know, the second act came to a close last year when Thoma Bravo bought the Coupa Factory, showed Robbie and a good portion of the management team the door (before they could get Inspired from the acquisition), and sat idly by as the rest of the senior management team moved on of their own accord, along with a significant number of the long-time employees. So many have left over the years that, at this point, of the 3,000 employees LinkedIn says they still have (which might not be entirely accurate as many who leave don’t update their LinkedIn until they get a new position), as of one week ago today, it would appear that there is not a single employee left who knows the potential platform capabilities better than the doctor. (Who is not only one of the only two remaining independent analysts in our space who have been covering Coupa since Procurement Independence day, but someone who has also advised, consulted for, or done diligence on half of their acquisitions — which is a heck of a lot more than their current stable of developers and managers can say. And yes, he’s choking on the truth at this realization!)

And the third act is not off to a great start. First of all, it took them a long time (almost a year) to find a new head of the Coupa Factory, leaving 3,000 poor, scared Oompa Loompas wondering about their future. Second, their management team is brand new and many don’t know the full history or power of the platform at their disposal. Third, their “make margins multiply” rebrand is the biggest marketing malarkey out there today (and the doctor hopes it’s just a moment of weakness and that they’ll move on from it quickly) and, to top it off, their new homepage is among the most uninformative buzzword-filled page you will find in Source-to-Pay. Fourth, there’s no centre anymore. It’s Finance. And Procurement. And Supply Chain. And IT. It’s not just a letdown, it’s the saddest part of all!

It’s important to remember that, unlike almost all of its competition that went on M&A sprees, Coupa’s philosophy was to integrate everything into the Coupa platform as natively as possible. If it was built on the same stack, in it went. If not, it was refactored into a (micro) service architecture with the front end UI rebuilt in the core and the back-end run in a service container, so it was one platform with one consistent UI for their customers. As a result, they are sitting on a powerhouse, and all they have to do is pick a direction and configure it as one. But this is not likely to happen, because it’s unlikely anyone left at Coupa can see what that direction is and could be. (So while this should be my greatest masterpiece when it comes to Coupa coverage, it is also a letdown.)

While no one can predict what the future holds, we can say that if Coupa doesn’t learn what they have, center on a direction, educate the next next generation on what Coupa can actually do, and come up with a meaningful message soon, there’s a good chance that the King of Karma may decided to collect his toll and this could be Coupa’s final act before it is folded into an amalgamated ThomaBravo FinTech platform designed to replace the ERP that currently powers the finance back office. (ThomaBravo have 80 companies in the portfolio, including a number in FinTech. If anyone was going to build the first FRP [Financial Resource Planning] solution designed to replace the ERP, it could be them.)

Thoughts to the contrary?