Category Archives: SaaS

LeanLinking: The Newest Contender in the SRM Arena

LeanLinking is a three year old Denmark company in the SRM space that you haven’t heard much about but should be aware of, especially if you are a smaller mid-market company, as this SaaS company has been rapidly developing their Best-of-Breed SRM solution since day one and it is now a very solid offering for a mid-market company desperate for supplier relationship management capability at a price-point they can afford (and this solution starts at a price point everyone can afford, but more on this later).

It’s certainly no competitor to HICX or State of Flux (both of which have been reviewed on this blog and both of which will soon see deep joint coverage by the doctor and the prophet over on Spend Matters Pro, more on this later) at this point, but when you compare it to the plethora of older-generation SIM solutions on the market, it’s the goose-that-laid-the-golden-egg for many smaller mid-market organizations that need something but have no real budget.

While the LeanLinking tool is essentially designed to help buyers build supplier report cards in preparation for supplier performance review, corrective action, and development meetings, monitor these scorecards over time, and track relevant aspects of supplier interaction, it’s built in such a way that encourages social interaction (which Generation Y likes and which the millennials like even more, which means it is something that is likely to get adopted). It also supports easy file-based data import (and can create complete data format descriptions for IT), which is very helpful to the mid-market, which keeps most of its data in Excel anyway (even though Excel is a damnation that should have already been exercised from the organization long ago). It also has a number of other basic capabilities you’d expect in a SRM system, including compliance tracking, contact management, and so on, but this is not the reason to take note of it.

The reason to take note of LeanLinking is that they realize that it’s hard for Procurement in most mid-size organizations to get any software budget (without a proven ROI, which, of course, can’t be proved until Procurement has the software — the never-ending catch-22) and have decided to bypass Finance (and IT) entirely by offering a consumer (buyer) subscription option starting at just £19 a month for a single buyer. This allows a buyer to expense the platform on his monthly expense report and bury the license cost until he has shown ROI (and then use that as an argument to get a department license, which will be a lot more valuable as the entire team will be able to share data, reduce duplication of effort, get funding to link in feeds from the ERP through the API, etc.).

It’s a novel concept and a novel platform. For more information, see the SM post by the doctor and the prophet as well as our in-depth Pro Analysis (membership required).

Why You Need MROaaS

Yes, you need MROaaS. Everyone needs MROaaS. ( But don’t tell your boss you need MROaaS, spell it out, because we all know what she’s likely to hear when your tongue trips over this one. 😉 ) Next to T&E (not T&A), it’s probably the biggest tail-spend savings opportunity in the enterprise. And it deserves to be addressed.

MROaaS, short for MRO-as-a-Service, which is itself short for Maintenance-Repair-and-Operations-as-a-Service (which is very unsexy when you say it this way), is, for large organizations that need to maintain a lot of inventory on hand, the biggest overlooked outsourcing opportunity in the business. Inventory is costly (and many estimates put annual inventory overhead at 25% of product cost). But not having the right inventory at the right place at the right time is even costlier. (Downtime leads to lost production and, ultimately, lost sales which is very costly when you still have to pay the day-to-day overhead, including your employees’ salaries.) And MRO is often the biggest consumer of long-term inventory (because the majority of goods for sale will move in and out within a few months, or even a few weeks, while MRO inventory could shit on the shelf for two years). So inventory optimization alone is a good reason to have good MRO.

But that’s not the only reason to have good MRO. The reality is that, in an average organization:

  • over 20% of inventory on the shelf is excess and/or obsolete
  • fill rates for most MRO storerooms are closer to 75%
  • there is supplier “lock-in” even where alternative sources of supply exist

And the losses mount quickly.

But these aren’t the only problems organizations face. Most also have to deal with

  • recall inventory not getting identified and then being used when it shouldn’t (which creates hazards)
  • significant expediting when a part is out of stock and it is needed yesterday
  • inefficient returns management when the wrong part gets shipped or a part is identifies as bad six months (or three years) down the road (when it might not even be returnable)

And the losses continue to mount.

But with good MRO:

  • excess and obsolete inventory can be reduced by up to 90% (or more)
  • fill rates can exceed 95%
  • alternative sources of supply are easily identified
  • recall inventory is immediately identified and returned
  • expediting becomes the exception rather than the rule
  • returns are properly handled in a timely fashion

And the organization stops bleeding red.

And this is why the organization needs good MRO. But why does it need MROaaS. Slowing down the cash hemorrhage is one thing. Improving the organization’s overall health is another. Good MRO can add value in a lot of ways. In addition to the inventory optimization that will see the results above, it can also provide:

  • proactive shipment monitoring to insure the right shipment is made at the right time
  • lean process improvement to take time and cost out of the process
  • supplier consolidation to allow for more volume-based cost reduction opportunities and more time to focus on each supplier
  • supplier development programs to insure that supplier performance improves over time

And this is just the tip of the iceberg a good MRO program can provide. But a typical organization, which never gets to the MRO tail-spend, is not an expert in MRO. It’s not even a novice in MRO management in most cases. This is where MROaaS comes in. For the most part, the only organizations that are true MRO experts are those that provide MROaaS. And since it takes true expertise to go from cost reduction to value generation, you need MROaaS.

And if you are still not convinced, the doctor and the maverick have put together a detailed four-part series over on Spend Matters on the subject that should provide all the education you need on why MROaaS is something that has to be considered if MRO spend is a significant part of the organization’s tail spend. Parts I and II are already up and available here:

  • MRO as a Service (Part 1): Embedding Procurement as the Value Engine
  • Unpacking and Applying the Value Streams of this Model: MRO-as-a-Service (Part 2)

What Would the Acquisition of SalesForce Mean to the Procurement Market?

Who Cares?

While the doctor and the maverick see eye-to-eye on a lot of issues, and that’s why they have been collaborating on the new Spend Matters CPO site because there are important messages that are just not being communicated by the new press at large, the doctor believes that the impact this acquisition will have on the Procurement market, as summarized in yesterday’s post on “what would the acquisition of salesforce mean to the procurement market” by the maverick, is not as important as the maverick seems to believe it is.

While the acquisition of SalesForce is an important topic, it’s no more important than the acquisition of any non-Procurement technology vendor. (While some SRM vendors use the platform, one has to remember that it is, at its core, a CRM platform). It’s (primarily) upstream, while Procurement is primarily downstream. While the processes should connect, they are still distinct and, unless you are in the middle of a negotiation, there’s no reason to even think about it as a Procurement issue.

The real issue is what does the acquisition of SalesForce mean to the technology market, and the market at large?

And while the doctor knows that he’s not just stirring the pot but the entire honeycomb on this subject, it’s a subject that needs to be addressed. So what does it really mean?

Simply put, too big to succeed!

One of the biggest problems with the technology market is that the misconception that bigger is better, and too big to fail, is a reality. The whole point of big was to benefit from economies of scale. But economies of scale have a limit. A single factory with a single production line can only produce so much going 24 hours a day. To go beyond that, you have to add another production line, or even another factory. If you do so, and you only reach half of the capacity, you don’t have the same economy of scale on the overage.  The biggest economy of scale was when you were at full capacity on the one line.

In other words, if you expand faster than demand, you waste time, money, and resources. This situation is bad, but the situation that occurs in an acquisition is much worse. Not only do you have more capacity, but you have a huge debt load as a result of the acquisition. So you are paying more to produce, and then you are paying even more to service the debt that you took on to produce more than you needed to.

But even this situation isn’t as bad as the situation where you are talking about technology companies that don’t produce physical goods, don’t have demand that typically rises with population increase or market growth, and have valuations that are many multiples of annual revenue — not profit, revenue. And we all know that the misconception that the product has already been built and the residual cost of sale is minimal is incorrect. Software has to be maintained, debugged, and constantly improved in order to be saleable to the mass market. That is costly. Whereas a product has a single production cost, possibly a single repair cost under warranty, and possibly a single reclamation or disposal cost, that’s it. The cost for each product is essentially one-time, whereas the cost of software is continual and adds up everyday it is in use.

As a result, you have software that typically:

  • cost millions to build
  • costs millions to maintain

and now you want to

  • add millions to the cost just so you can change ownership and assign a different name

It doesn’t make a lot of sense. Especially when you are talking about the acquisition of an 800 lb gorilla which already has a (relatively) complete solution. In this situation the acquirer is essentially admitting that either

  • its solutions are totally inadequate and it wasted millions of its customers dollars on its solutions (versus realizing that it has some good solutions, is missing a few key elements, and just needs to acquire a few point solutions from smaller vendors to fill the holes) or
  • it has no inherent capability to enter the space (and maybe it shouldn’t be entering the space to begin with).

And the acquiree is essentially admitting that

  • it cannot maintain (rapid) growth on its own anymore (which may not be bad if it’s the dominant player and has a very large recurring revenue and could continue to increase profitability with improved efficiency) or
  • it’s shareholders are greedy and impatient and don’t care what’s best for their customers and just want a quick payout.

Neither situation is good for either party. Nor does it make sense for any of the de facto tech giants who would likely acquire SalesForce to do so. None of the six AMIGOS (Amazon, Microsoft, IBM, Google, Oracle, and SAP) should acquire SalesForce. Here’s why.

  • Amazon
    They are an online e-commerce giant, with inherent ability to be a commodity supplier to large enterprises. They are not a software provider and beyond insuring quality, and receipt of goods, would not benefit from CRM. Sure the Force.com platform would allow them to offer even more apps, but they can already offer Android apps and sell online software, so it’s not a huge leap in capability.
  • Microsoft
    They already have huge back office suites that they have made huge investments in, including investments to port these suites to the cloud. Plus, their focus, and strength*, is back-office apps. They’d be taking a huge-write off on existing technology and would have to rewrite a lot for a whole new platform. They already run on Windows and Mac, that power the vast majority of office desktops, so why do they need the Force.com?
  • IBM
    IBM already has platforms for just about everything, including Alliance for CRM, have heavily invested in Watson, and need to keep building on the workflow and integration platforms they spearheaded in the early naughts.
  • Google
    the doctor will admit that it almost makes sense for Google, but Google’s market, and expertise, is apps, and it is still learning how to make money off of enterprise apps. It’s not ready for SalesForce, would have to let it run as a completely separate division, and take a huge hit to its balance sheet to pull of the acquisition. And while it’s the one company that could probably pull of a successful integration in a reasonable timeline without bleeding blood red everywhere, it would likely be quite a divergence from its other projects.
  • Oracle
    Oracle has too many CRM platforms as it is (with Siebel, PeopleSoft, CRM on Demand, and integration to about a dozen other platforms) and needs to continue to integrate and build on what it has. What makes Oracle strong, and great, is that it has always believed in eating it’s own dog food (while Microsoft ran off of third party databases even after SQL Server was released and has demoed Windows software releases on MacBooks on more than one occasion), but even Oracle can only integrate its acquisitions so fast. It’s still catching up on acquisitions past (and it took about 3 years to integrate the majority of Sun applications into its “single instance view”), so just imagine the effort to do a true end-to-end integration of SalesForce. Plus, it’s still a database / ERP company and with SAP so aggressively pursuing its marketshare in the US, with IBM and Microsoft still aggressively pursuing its global market, and with some companies (still) proclaiming that non-relational or in-memory databases can be faster and better for the average application, it has to focus on winning that fight.
  • SAP
    SAP is an ERP company with a very heavy focus on SRM, as evidenced by the huge amount of money it has dropped on Procurement, T&E, and Supply Management vendors over the past few years. This is where it has to focus to not only break-even on its acquisitions, but generate future value. And it still has a lot of integration to do. A lot.

the doctor‘s sure not everyone will agree with him, especially since people seem to get a little blind when such big numbers start flying around, but someone has to start putting this in perspective.

And now to put up the tarps in expectation of the reactionary mud-slinging from third parties not inclined to think deeply about the issue.

* And yes, the doctor cringes when he says this because most of their software, in his view, while standard, is sub-par — but they are the de facto solution and their Office apps, when you cut through the clutter (and the ribbon), work very well.

Best Practice Technology Vendor Selection for True Multi-Nationals

2012

  1. RFX: You’re Asking for the Wrong Information
  2. RFX: You’re Not Asking for the Right Information
  3. RFX: You’re Missing the Most Important Point
  4. Open the Doors for a Truly Successful RFP
  5. Stuck with an ERP? You Do Have Options!

2015 Reprise

  1. RFX: You’re Asking for the Wrong Information
  2. RFX: You’re Not Asking for the Right Information
  3. RFX: You’re Missing the Most Important Point
  4. Open the Doors for a Truly Successful RFP
  5. Stuck with an ERP? You Do Have Options!

Good Strategies for Microsoft AND Big Software Co. Enterprise Renewals

A guest post earlier this month over on Spend Matters on “5 Mistakes to Avoid When Renewing a Microsoft Enterprise Agreement in 2015” had some good tips not just for Microsoft Enterprise Agreement renewals but Big Software Co. Renewals in general.

The major pieces of advice generalize as follows:

Waiting until the last minute for renewal negotiations.

While this may have worked in the past, the bigger providers have smartened up. They have learned that it’s not the month or quarter or the year, but profit that matters, and will wait a month to get more profit when they are sitting on a huge cash reserve. Also, they have learned that if you wait until the last minute, you probably haven’t identified any other options, and even if you did, would not have time to implement another option and it’s you they have over a barrel, not the other way around. In addition, as per the article, there are only so many sales people and, unless you are a really big customer, if the sales people are busy, they may not get to you before the licenses expire and the systems lock up.

An over focus on price and an under focus on terms and conditions.

Price is important, but, as per the article, so is matching the service offering to the organizational need. Not only do you not want to over subscribe, and end up with a large number of unused licenses, but you don’t want to subscribe for products that don’t meet organizational needs either. But this isn’t the most important thing — it’s the fine print. If organizational needs are in flux, the last thing the organization wants to be is locked into a multi-year agreement or a minimum license count, with a huge penalty if the organization tries to end the agreement early. Similarly, the organization wants to understand the full cost of a cloud service and, if additional bandwidth or CPU usage costs can be added on during periods of intensive usage, this needs to be understood as well.

Treating negotiations as a one-time event.

The buying organization may set-and-forget the three year renewal until thirty (30) months, or more, have passed, but the vendor will be analyzing the contract, and usage, every quarter and looking for ways to extend the offering as soon as possible. The organization needs to monitor its usage as well to be able to make an informed counter to a vendor who indicates that the company is nearing capacity in licenses, computing power, etc. when it is still 20% away from maxing anything out and only increasing in usage at 1% a month.

Not being audit ready.

Chances are your Big Enterprise Software Vendor has an audit clause in the contract for any licenses installed on premise. And chances are that if the organization has not had an audit in the last couple of years, that, unless the organization agrees to the default renewal (which will often be for more licenses than required at a higher rate), that the customer will be audited for usage. The organization should do it’s own software (license) audits on at least an annual basis and keep detailed records. Not only will it have the data to dispute any claims to the contrary made by the vendor, but it will be able to make sure it remains in compliance at all times.

Enterprise software is costly. But it doesn’t have to be a spend sinkhole.