In Federalist No. 24, Hamilton further considers the powers necessary to the common defense, and, in particular, the specific objection that proper provision has not been made against the existence of standing armies in time of peace. In Hamilton’s view, this objection rests on weak and unsubstantial foundations, and this is easy to show.

In the proposed constitution, the whole power of raising armies was lodged in the LEGISLATURE, not in the EXECUTIVE; that this legislature
was to be a popular body, consisting of the representatives of the people periodically elected. Furthermore, restraints upon the discretion of the legislature
in respect to military establishments in time of peace, would be improper to be imposed, and if imposed, from the necessities
of society, would be unlikely to be observed.

Furthermore, previous to the Revolution, and ever since the peace, there has been a constant necessity for keeping small garrisons on our
Western frontier. No person can doubt that these will continue to be indispensable. In addition, If we should not be willing to be exposed, in a naked and defenseless
condition, to the insults and encroachments of Britain and Spain, we should find it expedient to increase our frontier garrisons in some ratio to
the force by which our Western settlements might be annoyed.

Thus, standing armies will be needed in times of peace, and it will be up to the Legislature to determine how big they need to be.

In Federalist No. 23, Hamilton takes up the topic of the necessity of a government as energetic as the one proposed to the preservation of the union.

In order to facilitate this inquiry, Hamilton determines that there is a need to address:

• the objects to be provided for by the federal government,
• the quantity of power necessary to the accomplishment of those objects, and
• the persons upon whom that power ought to operate

.

And to note that the principal purposes to be answered by union are:

• the common defence of the members,
• the preservation of the public peace as well against internal convulsions as external attacks,
• the regulation of commerce with other nations and between the States, and
• the superintendence of our intercourse, political and commercial, with foreign countries

Breaking these down, we find that the authorities essential to the common defence are:

• the raising of armies,
• the building and equipping of fleets,
• the prescription of rules for the government of both,
• the direction of their operations, and
• the provision of their support.

Thus, because it is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of national exigencies, these powers and authorities ought to exist without limitation, provided that the power is coextensive with all the possible combinations of such circumstances. In addition, defective as the present Confederation has been proved to be, this principle appears to have been fully recognized by the
framers of it; though they have not made proper or adequate provision for its exercise.

Furthermore, if you accept that the circumstances of our country are such as to demand a compound instead of a simple, a confederate instead of a sole, government and carry the argument further, you come to the conclusion that the government of the Union must be empowered to pass all laws, and to make all regulations which have relation to them. The same must be the case in respect to commerce, and to every other matter to which its jurisdiction is permitted to extend. In this situation, the POWERS are not too extensive for the OBJECTS of federal administration, or, in other words, for
the management of our NATIONAL INTERESTS.

When you consider the arguments put forth in this essay and the preceding twenty two, the need for an energetic government becomes clear when you consider that no other can preserve the Union of so large an empire, especially given the requirements outlined in this piece.

In Federalist No. 22, Hamilton continues to discuss other defects of the present Confederation.

He starts with a discussion of the regulation of commerce. He concludes that it is indeed evident, on the most superficial view, that there is no object, either as it respects the interests of trade or finance, that more strongly demands a federal superintendence. This is because the want of it has already operated as a bar to the formation of beneficial treaties with foreign powers, and has given occasions of dissatisfaction between the States.

He then goes on to note that in commerce, and other matters, the interfering and unneighbourly regulations of some States, contrary to the true spirit of the Union, have, in different instances, given just cause of umbrage and complaint to others, and it is to be feared that examples of this nature, if not restrained by a national control, would be multiplied and extended till they became not less serious sources of animosity and discord than injurious impediments to the intercourse between the different parts of the Confederacy. This not only prevents the creation, and adoption, of trade treaties but also lays the foundation for civil unrest, as discussed in previous essays.

Then we have the harsh reality that the power of raising armies, by the most obvious construction of the articles of the Confederation, is merely a power of making requisitions upon the States for quotas of men. This has resulted in a competition between the States which created a kind of auction for men where they outbid each other till bounties grew to an enormous and insupportable size. It should be clear that this method of raising troops is not more unfriendly to economy and vigour than it is to an equal distribution of the burden as it was a regular occurrence that States were delinquent in the supplies of men, the supplies of money, or both.

This in turn illustrates the absurdity of the right of equal suffrage among the states in the Confederation. Every idea of proportion and every rule of fair representation conspire to condemn a principle, which gives to Rhode Island an equal weight in the scale of
power with Massachusetts, or Connecticut, or New York. Its operation contradicts the fundamental maxim of republican government, which requires that the sense of the majority should prevail.

To give a minority a negative upon the
majority (which is always the case where more than a majority is requisite to a decision), is, in its tendency, to subject the
sense of the greater number to that of the lesser.

And to require unanimity is even worse. The necessity of unanimity in public bodies, or of something approaching towards it, has been founded upon a
supposition that it would contribute to security. But its real operation is to embarrass the administration, to destroy the energy
of the government, and to substitute the pleasure, caprice, or artifices of an insignificant, turbulent, or corrupt junto, to the
regular deliberations and decisions of a respectable majority. This is because, in those emergencies of a nation, in which the goodness or badness, the weakness or strength of its government, is of the greatest importance, there is commonly a necessity for action.
The public business must, in some way or other, go forward.

And then there is the want of a judiciary power. Laws are a dead letter without courts to expound and define their true meaning and operation. Thus, the treaties of the United
States, to have any force at all, must be considered as part of the law of the land. This can only happen if they can be submitted, in the lat result, to one SUPREME TRIBUNAL that is instituted under the same authority which forms the treaties themselves.

When all is considered, we conclude the necessity of laying the foundations of our national government deeper than in the mere sanction of delegated authority. The fabric of American empire ought to rest on the sold basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE.